Request #7609
I would like a copy of the bill presented to the City of Garden Grove ("the City") from Woodruff, Spradlin & Smart APC wherein this law firm billed Garden Grove approximately $1808.00 for preparing Garden Grove's frivolous Motion for Attorney fees in Austin v. Garden Grove (OC Superior Court Case No. 30-2020-01137146-CU-WM-CJC) which was heard on March 28, 2022 and resulted in the following ruling by Judge Martha K. Gooding:
Austin v. City of Garden Grove
Motion for Attorney Fees
Respondent/Defendant City of Garden Grove (“Respondent”) seeks an order awarding it attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $14,228.30 pursuant to Government Code section 6259. Respondent contends Petitioner Ronald Austin (“Petitioner”) requested the information for an improper purpose and the petition is clearly frivolous. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.
The Court denies Respondent’s request (made under Evidence Code §452(d)) that the Court take judicial notice of the fact that Petitioner filed petitions for writs of mandate and declaratory relief in the actions listed in the request for judicial notice.
The parties do not dispute that, although the petition was dismissed with prejudice, the Court may still hear this motion for fees under Government Code section 6259. (Parrott v. Mooring Townhomes Assn., Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 873, 877.)
Petitioner requested the name of an adult victim in an attempted robbery pursuant to the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”). (McEwen Decl., ¶ 3, Exhibit A.) Respondent denied the request, contending the information was exempt from disclosure on the ground that “the records pertain to an incident which constitute a juvenile record” and “the suspect(s) was a juvenile.” (Id.)
“If the court finds that the requester’s case is clearly frivolous, it shall award court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the public agency.” (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (d).)
“The PRA does not define the term ‘clearly frivolous’ for purposes of an award of fees and costs under that statute.” (Bertoli v. City of Sebastopol (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 353, 368.) However, California courts have adopted the test articulated in In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 183 to determine whether an appeal is frivolous. (Id.) The California Supreme Court “held that ‘an appeal may be deemed frivolous only when prosecuted for an improper motive--e.g., to harass the respondent or for purposes of delay--or when lacking any merit--i.e., when any reasonable attorney would agree the appeal is totally without merit.’” (Id.) The Court in Crews v. Willows Unified School Dist. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1368 “adopted the Flaherty paradigm when analyzing whether PRA litigation was ‘clearly frivolous’ for purposes of section 6259, subdivision (d).” (Id.)
Therefore, “unless a petitioner submits a PRA request for an improper purpose (such as harassment or delay), the petitioner’s motive in making the request is essentially irrelevant. (See § 6257.5 [‘This chapter does not allow limitations on access to a public record based upon the purpose for which the record is being requested, if the record is otherwise subject to disclosure.’].)” (Bertoli v. City of Sebastopol, 233 Cal.App.4th at 370 [emphasis original].)
A finding that a petition is “clearly frivolous” “can only be supported if the Petition, itself, was entirely lacking in merit. Put another way…we must determine that ‘any reasonable attorney’ would agree that the Petition was ‘totally’ without merit.” (Bertoli v. City of Sebastopol, 233 Cal.App.4th at 371.)
Although Respondent contends Petitioner has filed over 109 CPRA cases in the past five years, Respondent has not shown that Petitioner’s request for the identity of the adult victim in this instance is for an improper purpose. (McEwen Decl., ¶ 17.)
Respondent has not shown the petition was clearly without merit. Respondent’s refusal to provide the requested information (the adult victim’s name) is that “the records pertain to an incident which constitute a juvenile record” and “the suspect(s) was a juvenile.” (McEwen Decl., ¶ 3, Exhibit A.) Respondent relies on Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 and Wescott v. County of Yuba (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 103. Neither fully support Respondent’s position that the name of the adult victim cannot be disclosed. In addition, Respondent did not meet its burden to show an exemption from disclosure applies. (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 383, 398, fn. 10.) Respondent provided no evidence that the information actually requested related to a juvenile victim or juvenile perpetrator.
Pursuant to Government Code section 6254, subdivision (f)(2)(A), “The name of a victim of any crime defined by Section 220, 261, 261.5, 262, 264, 264.1, 265, 266, 266a, 266b, 266c, 266e, 266f, 266j, 267, 269, 273a, 273d, 273.5, 285, 286, 288, 288a, 288.2, 288.3, 288.4, 288.5, 288.7, 289, 422.6, 422.7, 422.75, 646.9, or 647.6 of the Penal Code may be withheld at the victim’s request, or at the request of the victim’s parent or guardian if the victim is a minor.” There is no showing the adult victim requested his identify be withheld.
Although Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 exempts juvenile records from disclosure, Respondent did not show section 827 or Wescott v. County of Yuba (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 103 applies to a request for only the adult victim’s name.
Section 827 defines a “juvenile case file” to mean “a petition filed in a juvenile court proceeding, reports of the probation officer, and all other documents filed in that case or made available to the probation officer in making the probation officer's report, or to the judge, referee, or other hearing officer, and thereafter retained by the probation officer, judge, referee, or other hearing officer.” In Wescott v. County of Yuba (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 103, the Court found section 827 “establishes that when minors are subjects of a police investigation and thereby become subjects of a police report, that report may not be released to one of the juveniles or an authorized representative without the consent of the others unless a court order is first obtained.” (Wescott v. County of Yuba (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 103, 105.) The Court held “the scope of section 827’s confidentiality requirement was determined to include police reports pertaining to minors who were not involved in juvenile court proceedings but had merely been temporarily ‘detained.’” (Id., at 106.) “Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 reposes in the juvenile court control of juvenile records and requires the permission of the court before any information about juveniles is disclosed to third parties by any law enforcement official. The police department of initial contact may clearly retain the information that it obtains from the youths’ detention, but it must receive the permission of the juvenile court pursuant to section 827 in order to release that information to any third party, including state agencies. Police records in this regard become equivalents to court records and remain within the control of the juvenile court.’” (Id., at 107, citing T.N.G. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 767, 780-781.)
Respondent did not show that a reasonable attorney would agree that the petition was completely without merit. Petitioner did not seek the police report or any information concerning a juvenile. Instead, Petitioner requested only the name of the adult victim. Although the name of the adult victim may be part of the juvenile’s record, Petitioner did not request the juvenile’s record. Respondent did not show through admissible evidence that the records of a juvenile were involved. Accordingly, Respondent’s motion for fees is DENIED.
Petitioner is ordered to give notice.
Correspondence
The City has completed its review and evaluation of your March 28, 2022 request in an effort to make a determination as to whether the request, either in whole or in part, seeks copies of disclosable public records in the possession of the City. The City has performed a reasonable review of its records to locate responsive, or potentially responsive, documents. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 627).
The City’s determination in this regard is as follows:
Request – “I would like a copy of the bill presented to the City of Garden Grove ("the City") from Woodruff, Spradlin & Smart APC wherein this law firm billed Garden Grove approximately $1808.00 for preparing Garden Grove's frivolous Motion for Attorney fees in Austin v. Garden Grove (OC Superior Court Case No. 30-2020-01137146-CU-WM-CJC).”
Records responsive to this request, or deemed potentially responsive, have been located, are currently being assembled, and will be promptly produced. However, records will not be produced, or will be redacted, to the extent they are determined to be exempt from disclosure pursuant to the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine (Government Code §6254(k), Evidence Code §954, Code of Civil Procedure §2018.030); Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court, (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282; County of Los Angeles Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court, (2017) 12 Cal. App.5th 1264.
The City is still in the process of gathering responsive, or potentially responsive, records related to the request above. Any and all non-exempt, non-privileged public records deemed responsive, or potentially responsive, to this request description will be produced for your review and inspection on or before Friday, April 15, 2022.
Due date extended to: Friday, April 15, 2022
I would like a copy of the bill presented to the City of Garden Grove ("the City") from Woodruff, Spradlin & Smart APC wherein this law firm billed Garden Grove approximately $1808.00 for preparing Garden Grove's frivolous Motion for Attorney fees in Austin v. Garden Grove (OC Superior Court Case No. 30-2020-01137146-CU-WM-CJC) which was heard on March 28, 2022 and resulted in the following ruling by Judge Martha K. Gooding:
Austin v. City of Garden Grove
Motion for Attorney Fees
Respondent/Defendant City of Garden Grove (“Respondent”) seeks an order awarding it attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $14,228.30 pursuant to Government Code section 6259. Respondent contends Petitioner Ronald Austin (“Petitioner”) requested the information for an improper purpose and the petition is clearly frivolous. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.
The Court denies Respondent’s request (made under Evidence Code §452(d)) that the Court take judicial notice of the fact that Petitioner filed petitions for writs of mandate and declaratory relief in the actions listed in the request for judicial notice.
The parties do not dispute that, although the petition was dismissed with prejudice, the Court may still hear this motion for fees under Government Code section 6259. (Parrott v. Mooring Townhomes Assn., Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 873, 877.)
Petitioner requested the name of an adult victim in an attempted robbery pursuant to the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”). (McEwen Decl., ¶ 3, Exhibit A.) Respondent denied the request, contending the information was exempt from disclosure on the ground that “the records pertain to an incident which constitute a juvenile record” and “the suspect(s) was a juvenile.” (Id.)
“If the court finds that the requester’s case is clearly frivolous, it shall award court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the public agency.” (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (d).)
“The PRA does not define the term ‘clearly frivolous’ for purposes of an award of fees and costs under that statute.” (Bertoli v. City of Sebastopol (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 353, 368.) However, California courts have adopted the test articulated in In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 183 to determine whether an appeal is frivolous. (Id.) The California Supreme Court “held that ‘an appeal may be deemed frivolous only when prosecuted for an improper motive--e.g., to harass the respondent or for purposes of delay--or when lacking any merit--i.e., when any reasonable attorney would agree the appeal is totally without merit.’” (Id.) The Court in Crews v. Willows Unified School Dist. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1368 “adopted the Flaherty paradigm when analyzing whether PRA litigation was ‘clearly frivolous’ for purposes of section 6259, subdivision (d).” (Id.)
Therefore, “unless a petitioner submits a PRA request for an improper purpose (such as harassment or delay), the petitioner’s motive in making the request is essentially irrelevant. (See § 6257.5 [‘This chapter does not allow limitations on access to a public record based upon the purpose for which the record is being requested, if the record is otherwise subject to disclosure.’].)” (Bertoli v. City of Sebastopol, 233 Cal.App.4th at 370 [emphasis original].)
A finding that a petition is “clearly frivolous” “can only be supported if the Petition, itself, was entirely lacking in merit. Put another way…we must determine that ‘any reasonable attorney’ would agree that the Petition was ‘totally’ without merit.” (Bertoli v. City of Sebastopol, 233 Cal.App.4th at 371.)
Although Respondent contends Petitioner has filed over 109 CPRA cases in the past five years, Respondent has not shown that Petitioner’s request for the identity of the adult victim in this instance is for an improper purpose. (McEwen Decl., ¶ 17.)
Respondent has not shown the petition was clearly without merit. Respondent’s refusal to provide the requested information (the adult victim’s name) is that “the records pertain to an incident which constitute a juvenile record” and “the suspect(s) was a juvenile.” (McEwen Decl., ¶ 3, Exhibit A.) Respondent relies on Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 and Wescott v. County of Yuba (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 103. Neither fully support Respondent’s position that the name of the adult victim cannot be disclosed. In addition, Respondent did not meet its burden to show an exemption from disclosure applies. (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 383, 398, fn. 10.) Respondent provided no evidence that the information actually requested related to a juvenile victim or juvenile perpetrator.
Pursuant to Government Code section 6254, subdivision (f)(2)(A), “The name of a victim of any crime defined by Section 220, 261, 261.5, 262, 264, 264.1, 265, 266, 266a, 266b, 266c, 266e, 266f, 266j, 267, 269, 273a, 273d, 273.5, 285, 286, 288, 288a, 288.2, 288.3, 288.4, 288.5, 288.7, 289, 422.6, 422.7, 422.75, 646.9, or 647.6 of the Penal Code may be withheld at the victim’s request, or at the request of the victim’s parent or guardian if the victim is a minor.” There is no showing the adult victim requested his identify be withheld.
Although Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 exempts juvenile records from disclosure, Respondent did not show section 827 or Wescott v. County of Yuba (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 103 applies to a request for only the adult victim’s name.
Section 827 defines a “juvenile case file” to mean “a petition filed in a juvenile court proceeding, reports of the probation officer, and all other documents filed in that case or made available to the probation officer in making the probation officer's report, or to the judge, referee, or other hearing officer, and thereafter retained by the probation officer, judge, referee, or other hearing officer.” In Wescott v. County of Yuba (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 103, the Court found section 827 “establishes that when minors are subjects of a police investigation and thereby become subjects of a police report, that report may not be released to one of the juveniles or an authorized representative without the consent of the others unless a court order is first obtained.” (Wescott v. County of Yuba (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 103, 105.) The Court held “the scope of section 827’s confidentiality requirement was determined to include police reports pertaining to minors who were not involved in juvenile court proceedings but had merely been temporarily ‘detained.’” (Id., at 106.) “Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 reposes in the juvenile court control of juvenile records and requires the permission of the court before any information about juveniles is disclosed to third parties by any law enforcement official. The police department of initial contact may clearly retain the information that it obtains from the youths’ detention, but it must receive the permission of the juvenile court pursuant to section 827 in order to release that information to any third party, including state agencies. Police records in this regard become equivalents to court records and remain within the control of the juvenile court.’” (Id., at 107, citing T.N.G. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 767, 780-781.)
Respondent did not show that a reasonable attorney would agree that the petition was completely without merit. Petitioner did not seek the police report or any information concerning a juvenile. Instead, Petitioner requested only the name of the adult victim. Although the name of the adult victim may be part of the juvenile’s record, Petitioner did not request the juvenile’s record. Respondent did not show through admissible evidence that the records of a juvenile were involved. Accordingly, Respondent’s motion for fees is DENIED.
Petitioner is ordered to give notice.
Please click on the link below to access document(s) responsive to your request.
Thank you,
City Clerk’s Office
City of Garden Grove